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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
automobile may be, not an unwise expansion or mistreatment of
agency, but a new liability in tort which will become accepted by
degrees. In spite of the persistency of the courts in calling this
thing agency it is true even today that it resembles an inde-
pendent tort liability-it need only be extended over the remainder
of the situations where the owner places a car in the hands of
another for operation. As to the wisdom, or necessity, of so ex-
tending it the courts or the legislature must decide, preferably
the legislature.
-R. P. HoLLANwD.
TAX EXEMiPTION OF PROPERTY USED FOR EDUCATIONAL, RiE-
LIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE PURposE.-The Constitution of West
Virginia provides that "all property, both real anid personal, shall
be taxed in proportion to its value * " 0 but property used for
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes;
all cemeteries and public property may, by law, be exempted from
taxation."' Pursuant to the authority vested in it by this pro-
vision of the Constitution the legislature has by statute exempted
certain property, among which is the following: "' * property
used exclusively for divine worship; parsonages, * * * property
belonging to colleges, seminaries, academies, and free schools, if
used for educational, literary or scientific purposes * * * property
used for charitable purposes, and not held or leased out for profit,
* 0 all property belonging to benevolent associations, not con-
ducted for private profit, and used exclusively for the purposes
of moral and physical education, * * * any hospital not held
or leased out for profit; * '" ' and, provided further, that such
exemption from taxation shall apply to all property, including
the principal thereof, and the income therefrom, held for a term
of years or otherwise under a bona fide deed of trust v * by a
trustee, e "  required by the terms of such trust to apply, an-
nully, the income derived from such property to education, re-
ligion, charity and cemeteries, when not used for private pur-
poses or profit.
Several interesting questions have arisen, and may arise, under
these provisions of our Constitution and statute. Our first in-
quiry is, may the legislature exempt any property from taxation
that it chooses, or is it limited in that it can only exempt "prop-
erty used for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
I Co.ST. art. 10, §1.
2 CODE, ch. 29, §57. Note Amendment 1927 Acts, ch. 14.
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purposes; all cemeteries and public property * 0 " ? Our court
has decided that under the Constitution all property is subject to
taxation, except such property as the legislature may exempt, un-
der the prescribed exceptions, and that any legislative exemption
of property not used for the enumerated purposes, is unconstitu-
tional and void." It will be noted that the Constitution provides
for exempting property used for the purposes named. Therefore
exemption depends upon use, not ownership.
4
Quaere, what will constitute a sufficient use of property for
educational, religious, and charitable purposes to entitle it to tax
exemption? It is a general principle, which our court has fol-
lowed, that exemption laws are to be construed strictly as against
those claiming exemption.5 The theory of this rule of strict con-
struction seems to be that all property should equally bear the
burden of taxation, for the corresponding benefits conferred by
the state, and thus only such property as clearly performs certain
obligations of the state, should be relieved of the burden of taxa-
tion.6 Our court has held that a Masonic lodge is a charitable and
benevolent organization, and where the property of the lodge is
devoted exclusively to the purposes of its businss, it is property
used for charitable purposes -and exempt from taxation.7 The
court pointed out the fact that the Constitution did not require
the use to be exclusively for the enumerated purposes. The weight
of authority is to the effect that Masonic lodges are charitable and
benevolent societies,8 but the Supreme Court of Maine, in consid-
ering their exemption law which corresponds to ours, reached a
different result.9 But when a portion of the lodge building is
rented to third persons, even where the income was used for
charitable purposes, and upkeep of the building, the property is
not exempt, as it is "leased for profit" within the terms of our
statute.10 The court did not consider the question of apportion-
ment, i. e. taxing that portion of the building rented, according to
the value of the part in relation to the value of the whole build-
ing, and exempting that part used for lodge purposes. While in
some cases there might be a practical difficulty involved, it seems
3 C. & 0. R. Co. v. Miller, 19 W. Va. 408 (1882); Reynolds Hospital V.
Marshall County Court, 78 W. Va. 685, 90 S. E. 238 (1916).
I ibid.
COOLEY TAXATION (4th ed.) 672; State ex rel v. Martin, 143 S. E. 346
(W. Va. 1928).
6 COOLEY, supra.
7 In re fasonic Temple Society, 90 W. Va. 441, 111 S. E. 637. (1922).
8 ibid, cases cited.
9 Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 429 (1882).
lo State v. MeDoDwell Lodge, 96 W. Va. 611, 123 S. E. 561 (1924). Ac-
cord see Seater v. Tupelo, 136 Miss. 269, 101 So. 372 (1924).
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a fairer result would be reached by apportionment, and in some
jurisdictions this has been done.:" It has been held that mere
occasional or temporary use of the property, such as renting din-
ing rooms in the lodge building for banquets, or ballrooms for
dances, will not constitute a sufficient "use for private profit" to
subject the property to taxation.1 2  Where property "actually
used for charitable purposes" is exempt, and the building is de-
stroyed by fire, the vacant land may be taxed.'3 However, where
the building is in the course of construction, even where exemp-
tion is based on use, the property is not subject to taxation., The
Colorado law provides that. lots with buildings thereon, if the
buildings were used for strictly charitable purposes, should be
exempt from taxation.'" In a recent case in that state a Masonic
association ownd a park, which it divided up into lots and leased
to individual members, who erected summer cottages, the grounds
'being used by Masons and their families as pleasure and recrea-
tional grounds, and as a health resort. The association used the
proceeds for charitable purposes, and the Colorado court held
this property exempt.' 6 It has been said that "exemption from
taxation of charitable institutions is based on benefits conferred
on the public and consequent relief of burden on the state to ad-
vance the interests of its citizens."' 7 The Colorado court seems
extremely liberal in its holding, and not to have followed the
strict rule of construction. The quid pro quo furnished for the
exemption seems meager, to say the least, for it appears the use of
the property was to "make life more pleasant for the members of
the association rather than to dedicate its property to charity."'"
The Illinois court on the other hand follows the rule of strict
construction, to a rather extreme degree, it is submitted. The
Illinois law,19 like the West Virginia, exempts property used
for charitable purposes, and not leased for profit. An old ladies'
home rented land for farming purposes, using the income exclu-
sively for their support. Even though the income from the land
"l Smith v. Board of Review, 305 Ill. 38, 136 N. E. 787 (1922); Y. W. C.
A. of the City of New York v. City of New York, 217 App. Div. 406, 216 N.
Y. S. 248 (1922); aff. 245 N. Y. 562, 157 N. E. 858 (1927) ; St. Mary's
School v. City of Concord, 80 N. H. 436, 118 Atl. 608 (1922).
12 Hardin v. Lodge, 23 Wyo. 522, 154 Pac. 323 (1916).
13 Y. M1. C. A. Ass'n. v. Monmouth County, 92 N. J. L. 330, 105 Atl. 726
(1919).
14 In re Children's Hospital v. Philadelphia, 82 Pa. Super. Ct. 196 (1923).
15 CONST. art. 10, §5, c. 1. 1921, 7198.
16 Board of Commissioners v. Masonic Ass'n., 80 Colo. 183, 250 Pac. 147
(1926).
17 School of Domestic Arts v. Carr, 322 Ill. 562,'153 N. E. 669 (1926).
is Criticism in 25 Mrcn. L. RFV. 815.
19 2 SuiTH-HuRD REV. ST., 1923, c. 120. CONST. 1870, art. 9, §3.
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was not sufficient to support the home, and they had to solicit
charitable subscriptions, the court held the farm land subject to
taxation. 20 It would seem that in Illinois the only way land could
be exempt as being used for charitable purposes would be for the
land to be actually occupied by a charitable organization. Quaere,
what would be the effect if the old ladies did the farming them-
selves? It seems at least open to question whether the legislature
intended the phrase "leased for profit" to apply to such a case,
and it seems further not open to question that this real estate was
being used to relieve a burdn of the state. Our court has held
that a hospital, where no profit was sought by the owners, and all
proceeds were devoted to its maintenance and support, is exempt
from taxation, even where payment was exacted from patients
able to pay.21 However, the mere fact a portion of the patients
are served free of charge will not exempt the hospital as a "pure-
ly public charity."2 2 The object of the owners in founding the
hospital seems to be the determining factor. In a recent case real
estate was conveyed to trustees, in trust for an educational insti-
tution, the income being used to pay off existing liens against the
property, none of it being applied to the school. The court held
that the real estate was subject to taxation. 28  The case appears
to be sound, for while it might be contended that the income was
applied to education in that the liens against the trust property
were being discharged, the court in following its rule of strict
construction held that the use contemplated by the Constitution
was primary and immediate, not secondary and remote. The prac-
tical result of holding otherwise would be to allow the donor to pay
his debts from the income of tax exempt property, which in effect
would come within the terms of the statute as "used for private
purposes and profit." The fllinois court in a recent case held
that where the income from trust property was loaned to de-
serving students, the property was not exempt as being used for
school purposes.2 4 Another interesting West Virginia case holds
that a parsonage is exempt from taxation, where it had been
rented to different individuals for a period of fourteen years, the
income being used to pay off the church debt, and maintain the
-0 People ex rel Baldwin v. Jessamine Withers Home, 312 Ill. 130, 143,
N. E. 414 (1924).
21 Reyolds Memorial Hospital v. County Court, 78 W. Va. 685, 90 S. E.
238 (1916). Ace. Baptist Hospital v. Nashville, 3 S. W. (2d) 1059 (Tenn.
1928).
22 San Antonio v. Santa Rosa Infirmary, 249 S. W. 498 (Tex. Civ. A.
1923).
23 State ex rel Farr et al 'v. Martin, 143 S. E. 356 (W. Va. 1928).
24 People ex rel Olmstead v. Univ. of Ill., 328 11. 377, 159 N. E. 811
(1927).
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property.25 The Minnesota court in a recent case held a parson-
age was not exempt as "church property" where it had been
rented to third persons, and the income applied to religious pur-
poses.
26
In West Virginia the law seems to be that property is exempt
where the income is used for education, religion or charity, pro-
vided the property is held in trust. Where there is no trust the
property is not exempt, even though the income is so used, for in
this case it is held or leased for profit, and not "used" for the
above named purposes. The apparent exception to this latter rule
seems to be in the case of parsonages, but the case might be dis-
tinguished on the ground that the phrase "held or leased out for
profit" does not follow the word "parsonage" in the statute,
which was the determining factor in the decision of State v. Mc-
DoweUl Lodge.2" However, it does seem the court relaxed some-
what its adopted doctrine of strict construction in State v. Kit-




25 State v. Kittle, 87 W. Va. 526, 105 S. E. 775 (1921).
20 State v. 'Union Congregational Church, 216 N. W. 326 (Minn. 1927).
See also Methodist Church v. San Antonio, 201 S. W. 669 (Tex. Civ. A.
1918).
27 Ibid, n. 10.
28 Ibid.
29 6 Words and Phrases, 5178.
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